Risk shifting consequences depending on manager characteristics by Andreu, L. et al.
Accepted Manuscript
Risk Shifting Consequences Depending on Manager Characteristics
Laura Andreu, José Luis Sarto, Miguel Serrano
PII: S1059-0560(17)30359-3
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2019.03.009
Reference: REVECO 1775
To appear in: International Review of Economics and Finance
Received Date: 30 April 2017
Accepted Date: 14 March 2019
Please cite this article as: Laura Andreu, José Luis Sarto, Miguel Serrano, Risk Shifting 
Consequences Depending on Manager Characteristics, International Review of Economics and 
 (2019), doi: 10.1016/j.iref.2019.03.009Finance
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to 
our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo 
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. 
Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the 
content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
RISK SHIFTING CONSEQUENCES DEPENDING ON 
MANAGER CHARACTERISTICS
Laura Andreua*, José Luis Sartoa, Miguel Serranoa
 a Accounting and Finance Department, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
March 2019
Abstract 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the performance consequences of the risk shifting behavior shown 
by domestic equity mutual funds through the analysis of monthly portfolio holdings. The 
aim is to assess the implications of risk shifting for mutual fund investors. Specifically, 
we study the performance consequences of different mechanisms of risk shifting, such as 
the change between equity and cash holdings and the change of the systematic or 
idiosyncratic risk within the equity positions. We find that funds that increase their risk 
level obtain significantly better performance than funds with stable or reduced risk levels. 
This finding is robust when controlling for fund characteristics such as past performance 
and fund size. Additionally, we examine whether the performance consequences of risk 
shifting depends on manager characteristics and find that manager gender, education and 
level of specialization are revealed as important variables to differentiate the performance 
consequences of risk shifting.
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Performance Consequences; Risk-Shifting.
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RISK SHIFTING CONSEQUENCES DEPENDING ON MANAGER 
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Introduction
The financial literature has deeply analyzed the causes and incentives of mutual fund 
managers to change risk since the seminal paper of Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996). 
These authors found evidence that portfolio managers increase the volatility of their 
portfolio in the second half of the year when they underperform in the first half. The 
incentive to shift risk is the disproportionately large amount of money flows into top 
performing funds compared to the outflows of poorly performing funds. The researchers 
argue that this asymmetry creates a tournament in which the winner is compensated by 
management fees earned on the assets acquired; managers of poorly performing funds 
can increase their chances of winning the tournament by increasing their portfolio 
volatility. If these managers perform well, they win more than they could lose if they 
perform poorly.1 Similarly, Taylor (2003) also suggests that the optimal response of a 
fund manager to the fund’s interim performance is an adjustment of its risk taking, 
because this maximizes the fund’s probability of achieving a top position at the end of 
the year.
Later, other studies also highlight the important role of compensation incentives in 
explaining risk taking and risk shifting behavior. Specifically, Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele 
(2009) examine the influence of employment risk and compensation incentives on risk 
taking. They find that, when employment risk is more important than compensation 
incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative 
to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. However, if employment risk is low, 
compensation incentives become more relevant, and fund managers with a poor midyear 
performance increase risk to match the midyear winners. Similarly, Massa and Patgiri 
(2009) also test how incentives affect performance and risk taking in the US mutual fund 
industry. The researchers show that contractual incentives play an important role in 
increasing the risk taking and performance of mutual funds. The higher performance is 
1 Later, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), among others, also demonstrate that fund 
investors tend to chase past performance investing in portfolios with good records but do not penalize poor 
performance equally.
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due not only to the higher risk of the fund strategies but also to an improvement in fund 
management. 
More recently, Lee, Trzcinka and Venkatesan (2015) also argue that the 
compensation contracts of portfolio managers can be as important as the response of flows 
to past performance to determine risk shifting behavior, because the vast majority of US 
portfolio managers have a contract with variable compensation based on the mutual 
fund’s performance relative to their benchmark.2 However, these contracts are 
asymmetric; therefore, the manager is not penalized if the fund underperforms the 
benchmark. Therefore, portfolio managers have incentives to shift the volatility of the 
fund to maximize the value of their compensation. Additionally, fund managers can 
change risk to impress fund investors (see, e.g.  Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sias, 2007; 
and Huang, Sialm and Zhang, 2011) or to manipulate taxes.3  
Overall, previous studies tend to hypothesize that risk shifting behavior is harmful 
to investors without focusing on its performance consequences. However, risk shifting 
behavior can be driven by very different reasons; therefore, the consequences can also be 
different. Obviously, risk shifting is undesirable for financial investors whether this 
behavior is motivated by the trades of unskilled fund managers or agency-prone managers 
who trade to increase their personal compensation. However, risk shifting can also be the 
result of trades of skilled managers who trade to take advantage of their stock selection 
and/or market timing abilities. In this case, risk shifting behavior would be desirable for 
fund investors, because they would benefit from superior performance. In fact, there is 
evidence that more active fund managers have superior investment abilities (see, e.g. 
Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009 and Fama and French, 
2010). 
The prior literature has only focused on analyzing the existence of risk shifting or 
tournament behavior through risk measures mainly based on fund returns (see, e.g., 
Daniel and Wermers, 2000). Therefore, it is important to extend previous evidence to 
investigate the performance consequences of risk shifting behavior using a holdings-
based measure of risk; only the recent paper of Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) address 
this issue. However, these authors examine semiannual or quarterly holdings while we 
provide more accurate results by using monthly holdings. Monthly portfolios 
2 Ma, Tang and Gómez (2019) investigates portfolio manager compensation in the US mutual fund industry.
3 Grau-Carles, Doncel and Sainz (2019) provides a method to identify top stable funds and therefore, to 
help investors to evaluate fund managers’ ability.
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significantly reduce the impact of intra-quarter round-trip trades on the empirical analyses 
of mutual fund trading (Elton et al.; 2010). Therefore, the first aim of the paper is to 
provide robust results about the performance consequences of risk shifting behavior by 
using monthly portfolio holdings.4
The second aim is to examine whether the consequences of mutual funds’ risk 
shifting behavior are the same in a developed market like the US and in less developed 
markets through the examination of a European market like the Spanish mutual fund 
industry. By the end of 2017, the Spanish fund industry was ranked eighth in the Euro 
Zone fund industry in terms of assets (European Fund and Asset Management 
Association, 2018). Additionally, the Spanish fund industry deserves attention due to 
some particularities.5 On one hand, the market is highly concentrated. The top 10 of the 
existing 87 Spanish fund companies control more than 75% of the total fund assets 
(Inverco, 2017). If we compare these figures with the US mutual fund industry, we find 
that competition in Spain is much more concentrated than that in the largest fund market 
in the world, where the top 10 companies manage approximately 58% of the total assets 
in 2016 (Investment Company Institute, 2017). On the other hand, the median fund size 
in Spain is much smaller than in the US market (as of December 2016 around $2,026 
million per fund in US as opposed to below $100 million in Spain). Finally, the Spanish 
market was used due to the availability of monthly portfolio holdings to assess the 
implications to fund investors as opposed to the usual quarterly portfolio holdings 
available for other markets.
Finally, the third aim is to examine the performance consequences of risk shifting 
not only based on the mechanisms used by managers i.e. changes in the composition 
between equity and cash holdings or by changing the systematic or idiosyncratic risk 
within the equity positions but  also depending on fund manager characteristics such as 
age, gender, tenure, and education.6
As opposed to the findings obtained in the US market, we find that funds that 
increase risk tend to perform better than funds that reduce or maintain stable risk levels. 
Hence, risk shifting appears to be an indicator of skilled fund managers adjusting their 
4 Andreu, Matallín-Sáez and Sarto (2018) also use monthly portfolio holdings in their performance 
attribution model to assess market timing skills.
5 Golez and Marin (2015) provide some insights about the particularities of the Spanish mutual fund 
industry.
6 The financial literature has previously investigated the impact of these characteristics on fund performance 
and the level of risk. However, there are no studies examining the consequences of risk shifting depending 
on them.
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portfolio composition to take advantage of investment skills. This finding is robust using 
different performance measures, several risk shifting proxies or mechanisms and 
controlling by fund characteristics. We also find evidence that all mechanisms of risk 
shifting are important. Finally, we also find robustness in the main finding of the paper 
when examining the performance consequences of risk shifting depending on manager 
characteristics. Specifically, the results provide evidence that, although increasing the risk 
level tends to always provide better performance than stable or decreasing risk levels, the 
decision of increasing risk is better when it is made by a female or specialist manager.
This paper contributes to several strands of the financial literature. First, this study 
provides a more powerful test for analyzing the performance consequences by using 
monthly portfolio holdings and the daily return data of the portfolios, which can provide 
more robust results than the previous paper by Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) analyzing 
semiannual or quarterly holdings, as well as monthly returns. Second, as far as we know, 
this is the first paper outside the US market that analyzes the performance consequences 
of risk shifting. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first analyzing 
the performance consequences of risk shifting depending on the sociodemographic 
characteristics of fund managers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
holdings-based measure of risk shifting and describes the methodology used. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 documents the main findings obtained in the study and 
Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology: The Risk Shifting measure
2.1 Portfolio Holdings Returns and Volatility
Mutual fund managers can change the risk level of their portfolio by holding assets with 
different risk characteristics or by changing the asset allocation of the portfolio. These 
two different strategies also allow fund managers to time the market through an 
appropriate decision of the securities that must be overweighted/underweighted in the 
first case or by an appropriate asset mix (proportion in equities vs proportion in fixed-
income and cash) in the second case. The financial literature has traditionally focused on 
managers’ motivation to shift risk by comparing the standard deviations of fund returns 
over two non-overlapping time periods (see, e.g., Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; 
Busse, 2001, Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2003). Certain exceptions are the studies by 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) who use mutual fund 
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holding data to compute changes in risk levels. However, as stated by Huang, Sialm and 
Zhang (2011), the comparison of risk levels between two non-overlapping time periods 
may capture exogenous changes in market conditions in addition to manager intentional 
changes in portfolio risk.7 Therefore, in accordance with Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011), 
we calculate the risk shifting behavior of mutual funds through the analysis of their 
portfolio holdings using identical time periods to estimate the realized volatility and the 
current holdings volatility. Consequently, the risk shifting measure will be able to capture 
the risk changes induced by changes in the portfolio composition and will be unbiased by 
changes in market conditions.
To calculate the current holdings volatility, we first must calculate the fund holdings 
return over time. The return of the fund portfolio holdings represents the return of a buy-
and-hold strategy, because it captures the return that the fund would have achieved if the 
holdings of the disclosed portfolios were maintained for the time period analyzed. The 
holdings returns can be calculated using portfolio weights or using the number of 
securities held (see, e.g., Meier and Schaumburg, 2006). 
This study uses the number of securities held in the last trading day of the month 
for which the portfolio is disclosed instead of the portfolio weights, because portfolio 
weights capture both the active trading and the passive changes that occur because of 
stock price changes. Hence, our study differentiates from Huang, Sialm and Zhang 
(2011), because these authors use constant portfolio weights to measure the current 
holdings volatility. We believe that our approach is more accurate, since the portfolio 
weights of the assets are time-varying depending on the manager decision to 
overweight/underweight a security and depending on the returns of the assets.
The database shows, for each reported portfolio, the money invested in each asset 
in the last trading day of the month. Therefore, setting that day as t=0, we calculate the 
number of securities held in each asset by each fund. This calculation is only valid on the 
reporting day t=0. The prices of securities vary over time; therefore, the number of 
securities is also changeable. Using the daily price information of the securities, we 
calculate the money invested in each security by each mutual fund from reporting day 
t=0 to day t= -62 to consider the days of a given quarter and have sufficient observations 
7 Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) find that, in bear markets, employment risk is more important than the 
compensation incentives for fund managers. Hence, fund managers with poor midyear performance tend to 
decrease the risk level to prevent the potential job loss. However, in bull markets where the employment 
risk is low, managers with poor midyear performance tend to increase the risk to match the midyear winners.
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to perform the estimation.8 Once the money invested in each asset is calculated from t=0 
to t= -62, the daily total assets under management (AUM) of mutual fund p in day t is 
calculated as follows:
(1)


n
j
tj
H
tp AUMAUM
1
,,
Where: AUMj,t captures the money invested in security j in day t, and  captures HtpAUM ,
the money invested in mutual fund p in day t according to the most recent portfolio 
holdings.
Hence, the daily return of the portfolio holdings of mutual fund p in day t ( ) is HtpR ,
calculated as follows:
(2)
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H
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Note that the variance of the holdings’ return of mutual fund p at day t depends on 
the money invested in the various securities held by the fund and on the NxN variance-
covariance matrix of the individual securities. However, to facilitate the calculation of the 
current holdings volatility, in accordance with the approach of Huang, Sialm and Zhang 
(2011), we calculate the standard deviation of the return of a hypothetical portfolio that 
held the most recently disclosed positions over the prior 3 months (i.e., the prior quarter 
or prior 62 days in our case), since it is computationally easier to calculate the volatility 
of a time series of portfolio returns than to estimate a variance-covariance matrix of stock 
returns. Hence, we calculate the standard deviation of daily returns from day t= 0 to 𝑅𝐻𝑝𝑡 
t= -62 to capture the current holdings volatility ( ). Therefore, the volatility patterns 𝜎𝐻𝑝𝑡 
associated with risk shifting are examined in an interval that begins three months before 
each reporting date (month) and ends in the reporting date. 
2.2 Realized Fund Returns and Volatility
From the database of the daily net asset values (NAV) of mutual funds, the daily fund 
return is calculated for each fund as the relative change in NAV. However, the NAV 
return is net of the different fees charged by the fund while the return of fund holdings 
does not consider these expenses. Thus, we calculate the gross daily return of a given 
mutual fund p in day t as follows:
8 We consider stock splits, reserve splits and other capital operations when calculating the number of 
securities in a given asset.
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Where:  is the realized gross return of mutual fund p in day t, and compiles R tpR , t,pFees
both management and custodial fees charged by mutual fund p in day t.
Then, we calculate the realized volatility of fund p at time t ( ) as the standard 𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑡
deviation of the actual daily gross returns over the prior 3 months (62 days). Hence, this 
volatility captures the total risk assumed by the fund. The use of daily instead of monthly 
returns as in previous studies (see, e.g. Huang, Sialm and Zhang, 2011) allows us to 
consider the recent past of the mutual fund and not 3 years of monthly data to have 
sufficient observations to calculate the realized volatility. Note that the consideration of 
long-term periods can introduce a bias due to possible changes in market conditions.
2.3 Risk Shifting Measure
As in Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011), the risk shifting of a mutual fund p at time t is 
measured through the following expression:
(4)𝑅𝑆𝑝𝑡 = 𝜎𝐻𝑃,𝑡 ― 𝜎𝑅𝑃,𝑡
Where: is the current holdings volatility based on the fund’s most recently disclosed 𝜎𝐻𝑝𝑡 
portfolio, and  is the past realized volatility based on the fund’s realized returns.𝜎𝑅𝑝𝑡
The realized volatility would be identical to the current holdings volatility only if 
the fund maintains constant portfolio weights over the prior 3 months. In this case, there 
is no risk shifting. In contrast, the risk shifting measure RSp,t is positive if the most recently 
disclosed holdings exhibit a higher volatility than the actual holdings over the prior 3 
months and is negative otherwise. Thus, a positive risk shifting measure indicates that a 
mutual fund has increased the portfolio risk during the time period analyzed, which can 
be achievable either by holdings assets with higher risk levels or by changing the asset 
allocation of the portfolio. 
The use of identical time periods to estimate both volatilities allows us to capture 
the changes in risk induced by changes in the portfolio holdings and is unaffected by 
changes in market conditions. Nevertheless, the RS measure can be biased due to the 
following reasons. First, the measure may capture the impact of interim trades, window 
dressing or other unobserved actions of fund managers because the current holdings 
volatility is based on disclosed portfolio holdings (see, e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm and 
Zheng, 2008). However, the use of monthly portfolio holdings instead of semi-annual or 
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quarterly holdings as in previous studies reduces this problem.9 Second, the RS measure 
is defined as the difference between two volatility measures; therefore, it can be affected 
by the volatility level of the fund. However, this problem can be addressed by defining 
the metric as a ratio, as we will discuss later.
3. Data
The study focuses on the performance consequences of risk shifting of actively managed 
Spanish domestic equity funds from December 1999 to December 2011. However, since 
we need daily return data of a quarter to compute the risk shifting measure of each mutual 
fund, we lose the first three months of the return and holdings information of all funds. 
Thus, the final time period covers from March 2000 to December 2011.
For our empirical study, we merge the portfolio holdings information of the mutual 
fund database provided by the Spanish Securities Exchange Commission (CNMV) and 
the Morningstar Direct database. Specifically, the CNMV database has information on 
daily returns and monthly/yearly fund characteristics such as the total net assets, the 
number of investors, the management fees and the name of the management company for 
all Spanish mutual funds. This database also contains quarterly portfolio holdings’ 
information for all Spanish mutual funds over time. Therefore, this database is free of 
survivorship bias. 
In addition to this information, CNMV provided us monthly portfolio holdings from 
December 1999 to December 2006 for research purposes; this overcomes any problem of 
reporting selection bias that can be present in previous literature using high frequency 
portfolios where management companies voluntarily supply the portfolio holdings of 
their funds to private data providers (see, e. g., Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny and Ozelge, 
2010).10 Consequently, the Morningstar Direct database is only used to complete the 
CNMV quarterly portfolio holdings from January 2007 onwards with monthly holdings 
when available. As stated by Elton, Gruber and Blake (2012), Morningstar as well as 
CNMV holdings data not only include holdings of traded equity but also holdings of 
bonds, preferred stock, other mutual funds, nontraded equity, derivatives and cash. Both 
9 Note that Spanish management companies must only report their holdings to fund investors on a quarterly 
basis. Hence, monthly holdings are not available for individual investors, and they should not suffer from 
window dressing practices.
10 Monthly portfolio holdings provided by CNMV contains disclosed and undisclosed months, since 
management companies in Spain must report to investors on a quarterly basis, which is more frequent than 
the European Union’s requirement of semiannual portfolio reports. The fiscal year of Spanish management 
companies is the natural year. Therefore, mandatory reports are those at the end of each quarter. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
10
databases were matched by fund names and fund ISIN code (International Securities 
Identification Numbering). 
We focus on actively managed Spanish domestic equity funds. Therefore, we 
eliminate balanced, bond, international or index funds. The initial sample includes 173 
funds that report at least one year of daily returns and 11 portfolio holdings. From this 
sample, we eliminate funds that do not fulfil the official investment requirement of this 
investment category to ensure that all portfolios analyzed were appropriately classified as 
Spanish domestic equity funds.11 The final sample consists of 144 Spanish domestic 
equity funds. The removal of these misclassified funds implies no bias in the sample. The 
matching of CNMV and Morningstar datasets has allowed us to analyze a total number of 
10,730 portfolio holdings, which represent 81.9% of all the fund-months in the sample 
period.
In relation to the security returns, our study mainly relies on DataStream, which 
provides daily information regarding the returns of domestic and foreign stocks 
considering capital operations such as stock splits, the payment of dividends and seasoned 
equity offering. Hence, we have information about the daily returns of stocks across the 
entire sample period. The ISIN code of each stock is used to link portfolio holdings with 
the stock returns. Additionally, the returns of Treasury Bills and other fixed-income 
securities are calculated using indices published by Analistas Financieros 
Internacionales (AFI). Finally, a low percentage of fund total assets (see Table 1) are 
non-controlled securities, which, together with cash and cash equivalents, receive a zero 
return. The Ibex-35 total return index is used as a proxy for the market return, while one-
day T-bill Repos yield is the proxy for the risk-free rate. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 144 distinct funds in our sample of 
Spanish domestic equity funds during the 2000-2011 period. The number of funds ranges 
from 102 in 2000 to 72 in 2011. Specifically, Table 1 summarizes statistics on fund total 
net assets (TNA), percentage money flow (PMF), number of investors, average number 
of stocks held in the portfolios, annual turnover, active share (computed as in Cremers 
and Petajisto, 2009 using the Ibex35 as equity benchmark), age and annual management 
and custodial fees. 
Table 1 also summarizes information regarding the portfolio holdings of Spanish 
domestic equity funds. The holdings database includes not only the long positions in 
11 These funds must invest at least 75% of their assets in equities in any month.
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domestic common stocks but also other non-equity holdings. Since we focus our analysis 
on equity mutual funds, the average percentage of the portfolios invested in stocks (79%) 
represents the most important asset class, with the remaining assets invested in fixed-
income, other mutual fund units and cash or cash equivalents. Non-controlled securities 
only take an average value of 3.4% of our portfolios. This low percentage reinforces the 
quality of our database. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of Spanish domestic equity fund
The table summarizes the characteristics of mutual funds in the sample over the time period analyzed: 
March 2000-December 2011. The table reports the mean and median values of the variables and their 
standard deviation over the time. Specifically, the table shows the number of funds analyzed, their size 
(TNA), the monthly percentage money flows (PMF), the number of investors, the average number of 
distinct stocks held by the portfolios, the annual turnover, the active share and the age of the portfolios as 
well as the distribution of the portfolio holdings into the different asset classes (% invested in stocks, fixed-
income securities, other fund units and cash and cash equivalents). 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
Number of Funds 91 96 12
Total Net Asset (thousand €) 56,913.8 26,045.1 89,164.9
Monthly Percentage Money Flow (thousand €) -927.9 -168.6 7,461.7
Number of Investors 2,352 832 3,873
Average No. of stocks held 35.7 35.0 11.51
Annual Turnover (%) 43.6% 35.5% 31.9%
Active Share (%) 39.3% 34.8% 19.7%
Age (in Years) 9.2 9.1 4.9
Annual Management Fees (%) 1.9% 2.0% 0.5%
Stock Proportion (%) 78.8% 80.0% 14.6%
Fixed-Income Securities (%) 14.8% 11.8% 12.3%
Other Mutual Fund Units (%) 5.2% 4.4% 4.5%
Cash and Cash Equivalents (%) 19.9% 18.2% 13.5%
Non-controlled Securities (%) 3.4% 1.4% 5.9%
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1 Characteristics of Risk Shifters
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of risk shifters by averaging funds in five 
portfolios sorted according to the most recent RS measure. Portfolio 1 gathers those funds 
that have reduced their risk level the most (decile 1), while Portfolio 5 compiles those 
mutual funds that have increased their risk level the most (decile 10). Specifically, funds 
in portfolio 1 decrease risk on average by 0.46% per month. Conversely, funds in portfolio 
5 increase risk by 0.39% per month. Thus, funds exhibit significant changes in their 
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overall risk levels over time. We observe that funds in portfolio 5 exhibit the highest 
current holdings volatility, and their realized volatility is not very different from the mean 
realized volatility. In contrast, funds in portfolio 1 have the highest realized volatility, and 
their current holdings volatility is not substantially different from the mean holdings 
volatility.
Table 2 also reports that funds that increase risk share similar characteristics to 
funds that decrease risk. Funds that increase risk (funds in decile 10) are smaller, younger 
than funds with more stable risk levels.
Table 2: Fund Characteristics by Risk Shifting
This table summarizes the average characteristics of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to the most 
recent risk shifting measure. The difference in current holdings volatility and past realized volatility is 
defined as the risk shifting measure (RS). TNA is measured in thousands of Euros, # of investors represents 
the number of people putting their money in the mutual fund, and age is defined in years.
RS RS Current Past    
Portfolio Range Mean
Holdings 
Volatility
Realized 
Volatility TNA
# of 
Investors Age
1 Decile 1 -0.0046 0.0095 0.0141 54,748 2,709   7.54   
2 Deciles 2-3 -0.0023 0.0109 0.0131 90,694 4,226   9.22   
3 Deciles 4-7 0.0000 0.0122 0.0121 63,239 2,915   8.36
4 Deciles 8-9 0.0025 0.0127 0.0102 48,937 1,607   7.85   
5 Decile 10 0.0039 0.0136 0.0097 34,185 1,064   8.03   
4.2 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting
The financial literature usually adjusts for risk and style by estimating the factor loadings 
for each fund over a rolling window using prior data and then computing abnormal returns 
in the subsequent period as the difference between the actual fund return and the expected 
fund return based on the estimated factor loadings. As stated by Huang, Sialm and Zhang 
(2011), this methodology is not appropriate in our paper, since we focus on funds that 
change their risk exposures over time. The factor loadings estimated over prior windows 
may not be accurate for funds that shift risk levels. Therefore, we use a portfolio approach 
in which we form the previously explained five portfolios of funds with similar risk 
shifting levels according to their most recent RS measure and estimate the risk exposures 
in the sample based on the returns of these portfolios.
We use various performance measures to evaluate the performance consequences 
of shifting risk. Hence, we compare the performance of funds that increase or decrease 
the risk level of the portfolio with the performance of funds with more stable risk 
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properties. Specifically, six different performance measures for the fund portfolios are 
used. We compute gross returns and net returns (the former are relevant to evaluate the 
management performance, while the latter are relevant from an investors’ perspective) 
and excess market returns to evaluate the performance against the value-weighted market 
portfolio. Additionally, to adjust for risk and style effects, the one-factor CAPM alpha, 
the Fama and French (1993) alpha and the Carhart (1997) alpha are examined.12
Portfolio returns are computed as the equal-weighted mean returns of all funds in 
the corresponding RS portfolio over the next month (t+1) and the next quarter (t+3). The 
alphas of the portfolios are estimated using the time-series of fund portfolio gross returns. 
The results are summarized in Panels A and B of Table 3. 
Table 3. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting
This table reports the performance of mutual fund portfolios sorted according to the most recent risk shifting 
measure (RS measure). Panel A summarizes the performance consequences of risk shifting in the short-
term (next month), while Panel B summarizes the results in the next quarter. All measures are expressed in 
% terms. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: t+1
RS Portfolio Gross Return Net Return Excess Market CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1 0.11% -0.05%  -0.13%* -0.15%*** -0.17%*** -0.20%***
2 0.28% 0.11% 0.03% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04%
3 0.19% 0.03% -0.05% -0.03% -0.07% -0.06%
4 0.41% 0.25% 0.16% 0.21%** 0.11% 0.11%
5 0.29% 0.13% 0.04% 0.10% 0.02% 0.06%
# 5-1 0.17% 0.18% 0.17% 0.24%*** 0.19%*** 0.26%***
# 5-3 0.09% 0.10% 0.09% 0.13%** 0.09% 0.12%**
# 1-3 -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% -0.11%* -0.10%* -0.14%**
Panel B: t+3
RS Portfolio Gross Return Net Return Excess Market CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1 0.35% -0.13%  -0.53%***  -0.59%*** -0.70%***  -0.90%***
2 0.88% 0.40% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02% 0.05%
3 0.74% 0.26% -0.15% -0.09%  -0.21%**  -0.20%**
4 1.36%* 0.90% 0.48%** 0.61%*** 0.30%** 0.31%**
5 1.01% 0.54% 0.12% 0.29% 0.07% 0.20%
# 5-1 0.65% 0.67% 0.65%** 0.88%*** 0.77%*** 1.11%***
# 5-3 0.27% 0.28% 0.27% 0.39%*** 0.28%*** 0.40%***
# 1-3 -0.39% -0.40%  -0.40%**  -0.49%***  -0.49%***  -0.70%***
12 The factors of size, book to market and momentum have been calculated in accordance with the same 
procedure detailed on the website of Kenneth French considering the stocks traded in the Spanish stock 
market (see, e.g., http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
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Table 3 shows that funds that reduce the risk level the most obtained a negative and 
statistically significant performance regardless of the time period examined (t+1 and 
t+3). In contrast, funds that assumed the highest risk level (portfolio 5) obtained a positive 
but not significant performance, while funds in portfolio 4 achieve a positive and 
statistically significant performance. This finding indicates that the improvement in 
performance is not sequential. This fact is observed in the different performance measures 
(CAPM, Fama and French and Carhart alpha) and in both panels.
This finding of superior performance for funds increasing the risk level contrasts 
with the result in the US market where increasing risk is harmful for financial investors 
(see, e.g., Huang, Sialm and Zhang; 2011). The table also shows that funds that increase 
risk experience better subsequent abnormal performance than funds with stable or 
reduced risk levels. This finding provides evidence that risk shifting is not harmful to 
investors; instead, it is the opposite.
4.3 Mechanisms of Risk Shifting 
Mutual funds can change the risk level of their portfolios through several mechanisms. 
First, mutual funds can change the composition between equity holdings and cash 
holdings. Second, within their equity holdings, funds can change their exposure to 
systematic risk by switching between stocks with high or low beta; they can change their 
idiosyncratic risk exposures by deviating from their benchmarks or by changing the 
portfolio concentration in particular industries and styles.
We construct alternative RS measures based on some of these mechanisms of risk 
shifting and investigate the performance consequences using each alternative measure. 
These alternative RS measures are detailed below.
- Risk Shifting Ratio: We calculate the ratio between the current holdings 
volatility and the past realized volatility. 
(6)R
tp
H
tpH
tpRatioRS
,
,
, 
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- Systematic Risk Shifting: Fund managers may shift risk in an effort to take 
advantage of investment opportunities due to their management skills. Fund managers 
may change their exposure to systematic risk if they believe that they have superior 
market timing abilities. The systematic risk shifting measure is defined as follows:
(7)𝑅𝑆𝛽𝑃,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐻𝑃,𝑡 ― 𝛽𝑅𝑃,𝑡
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Where: is the weighted average of the CAPM, Fama and French and Carhart market 𝛽𝐻𝑝𝑡  
beta of the most recently disclosed holdings13, and is the CAPM, Fama and French 𝛽𝑅𝑝𝑡  
and Carhart market beta of the daily realized returns over the prior year. 
- Idiosyncratic Risk Shifting: Fund managers may change the idiosyncratic risk 
of their portfolio if they believe that they have stock selection ability. Specifically, the 
idiosyncratic risk shifting measure is defined as follows:
(8)𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑃,𝑡 = 𝜎𝐻, 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑡 ― 𝜎𝑅, 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑡
Where: is the idiosyncratic volatility of the most recently disclosed fund 𝜎𝐻, 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑡  
holdings return, and is the idiosyncratic volatility of the past realized fund 𝜎𝑅, 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑡  
return. The idiosyncratic volatilities are computed as the standard deviations of the 
residuals from the CAPM, Fama and French or the Carhart factor regressions over the 
prior year. 
- Equity-based Risk Shifting: Fund managers can also modify the risk level 
through a change in the composition of the portfolios. Specifically, by increasing the 
percentage that equity holdings represent in the portfolios, fund managers increase the 
risk level and vice versa. Therefore, we define the following equity-based risk shifting 
measure:
 (9)𝑅𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑡 = 𝑤𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃,𝑡 ― 𝑤𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃,𝑡
Where:  is the most recently disclosed proportion invested in equity securities, and 𝑤𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑡
 is the average percentage invested in equity securities over the prior quarter.𝑤𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃,𝑡
Table 4 reports the performance consequences of risk shifting based on the 
abovementioned four alternative RS measures. Panel A shows the consequences in the 
next month (t+1), while Panel B shows the consequences in the next quarter (t+3). The 
first column compiles the five RS portfolios analyzed. These portfolios are formed as in 
Table 3. Columns 2-4 report the results for the RS ratio; columns 5-7 report the results for 
the systematic RS measure. Columns 8-10 report the results for idiosyncratic RS measure, 
while columns 11-13 report the results for the equity-based RS measure. The table shows 
the CAPM, Fama and French and Carhart alphas as measures of abnormal performance 
for fund portfolios formed according to each of these alternative RS measures. 
13 The betas of individual stocks are estimated using the one-factor model, 3-factor model or 4-factor model 
with one year daily returns prior to the portfolio reporting date.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
16
Table 4. Performance Consequences using alternative Risk Shifting Measures
This table reports the CAPM, Fama and French and Carhart alphas of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to the most recent risk shifting measure. We compute four 
different measures of risk shifting: the ratio between the current holdings volatility and the past realized volatility, the systematic risk shifting, the idiosyncratic risk shifting, 
and the equity-based risk shifting measures. Panel A shows the results for the next month (period t+1), and Panel B shows the results for the next quarter (period t+3). *; ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A t+1
RS ratio Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RSRS 
Portfolio
CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1 -0.07% -0.09% -0.13%** 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% -0.01% -0.12%  -0.17%** -0.19%**
2 0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 0.00% 0.01%
3 -0.03% -0.07% -0.06% 0.00% -0.04% -0.04% 0.06% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% -0.04% -0.03%
4 0.16% 0.07% 0.07% 0.21%** 0.12% 0.12% 0.11% 0.04% 0.07% 0.00% -0.06% -0.05%
5 0.15% 0.06% 0.09% 0.08% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% -0.10% -0.07% -0.04% -0.10% -0.10%
# 5-1 0.21%*** 0.14%*** 0.22%*** 0.07%** 0.00% 0.04% -0.02% -0.10% -0.06% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
# 5-3 0.18%*** 0.13%** 0.15%*** 0.09% 0.05% 0.10%* -0.06% -0.12%** -0.09%* -0.06% -0.06% -0.07%
# 1-3 -0.03% -0.02% -0.06% 0.01% 0.04% 0.06% -0.04% -0.02% -0.03% -0.14%** -0.13%** -0.15%***
Panel B t+3
RS ratio Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RSRS 
Portfolio
CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1  -0.30%***  -0.37%***  -0.50%*** -0.11%  -0.13%*  -0.12%* 0.04% -0.04% -0.03%  -0.29%**  -0.39%***  -0.51%***
2 -0.11%  -0.167%* -0.14% -0.07% -0.11% -0.04% 0.03% -0.02% -0.01% 0.07% -0.04% 0.00%
3 -0.09%  -0.21%**  -0.20%** -0.02% -0.14% -0.12% 0.13% -0.01% 0.00% 0.03% -0.14% -0.16%
4 0.47%*** 0.19% 0.21% 0.68%*** 0.37%*** 0.35%** 0.29%* 0.11% 0.19% -0.08%  -0.29%***  -0.29%**
5 0.46%** 0.20% 0.31%* 0.15% -0.06% 0.12% -0.05%  -0.36%* -0.23% 0.06% -0.11% -0.11%
# 5-1 0.75%*** 0.57%*** 0.81%*** 0.25%*** 0.07% 0.25%*** -0.09%  -0.32%***  -0.20%* 0.35%*** 0.28%** 0.40%***
# 5-3 0.55%*** 0.41%*** 0.51%*** 0.17% 0.07% 0.24%**  -0.19%*  -0.35%***  -0.23%*** 0.03% 0.03% 0.05%
# 1-3  -0.21%**  -0.16%*  -0.30%*** -0.09% 0.00% -0.01% -0.09% -0.03% -0.03%  -0.32%***  -0.25%***  -0.35%***
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Table 4 shows that the results are not affected qualitatively by using the RS ratio. 
The results of the RS ratio are consistent with those obtained in Table 3. The findings 
indicate that funds that reduce risk have poor subsequent performance both in the next 
month and in the next quarter (see Panel A and B, respectively). If we compare the 
portfolios, we can observe that funds that increase risk obtain a positive and statistically 
significant outperformance compared with funds that maintain stable risk levels and funds 
that reduce their risk. Note that the results in Panel B of Table 4 are more significant than 
the findings in Panel A. 
Similar to the RS measure and the RS ratio, we also find that those funds that 
decrease their risk level through alternative measures tend to experiment negative 
performance that is statistically significant in some cases. Furthermore, we also find a 
positive and statistically significant difference in the performance among funds that 
increase and reduce the risk through the systematic and equity-based RS measures when 
examining the consequences in the next quarter.
However, the findings obtained when using the idiosyncratic risk are slightly 
different. Table 4 shows that increasing the idiosyncratic risk, which occurs when funds 
increase their portfolio concentration, leads to underperformance. This finding is 
consistent with the paper by Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) and suggests that the driver 
of the poor performance for increasing idiosyncratic risk is the poor stock-picking 
abilities.14
4.4     Robustness analysis of the Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting.
In order to provide robustness to previous results obtained in Tables 3 and 4, we carried 
out two additional analyses to control for fund characteristics given that previous 
literature has documented their influence on fund performance and the risk level assumed 
by funds. Tables 3 and 4 are univariate given that they only consider the performance 
consequences depending on the RS measure. However, certain fund characteristics (i.e., 
fund size, past performance) can influence on both fund performance and the risk shifting 
behavior. For that reason, we firstly carried out a multivariate analysis by double sorting 
fund portfolios.
First, for each fund characteristic examined we divide mutual funds in each month 
into two groups depending on whether the fund characteristic is above or below the 
14 Ang et al. (2006) report that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility based on daily returns tend to exhibit 
relatively poor abnormal returns in the subsequent month.
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median value. Second, we further divide the two groups of funds into five portfolios 
according to their most recent RS measure. The results obtained are summarized in Table 
5. Panel A of Table 5 shows the results for the subsequent CAPM alphas for the ten 
mutual fund portfolios whereas Panel B shows the results for Carhart’s alphas. 
Specifically, the fund characteristics considered include past performance, fund size, fund 
age and fund management fees. These variables are similar to those used in the paper of 
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011). 
Fund past performance may reveal the ability and incentives of fund managers. As 
previously discussed, different authors like Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) suggest that past winners and losers have different 
incentives to take and change risk. The first columns of Table 5 sort mutual funds by their 
prior year excess return and the RS measure. Similarly, fund size, fund age and 
management fees can also be a determinant of both, fund performance and risk shifting 
given that previous literature has documented certain agency problems between fund 
characteristics and investor attitude.
Table 5 provides robustness to our previous finding given that increasing risk leads 
to a higher performance than reducing risk (see, comparison 5-1). This performance 
difference is always positive and it is statistically significant in the majority of the cases. 
Specifically, we find that increasing risk instead of reducing it leads to outperformance 
both in winner and loser funds when past performance is examined and in both young and 
old funds (see, e.g., Panel B). Hence, Table 5 provides evidence that increasing risk leads 
to better performance even after controlling for mutual funds characteristics.
Secondly, we carried out a multivariate regression analysis to investigate the 
relation between the RS measure and subsequent fund performance. This methodology 
also allows us to control for additional fund characteristics. We run the following 
regression:
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑆𝑝,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑝,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑝,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽4
(10)𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑝,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑝,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑝,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑝,𝑡 ― 12 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡
Where: the dependent variable (Perf) in each cross-section is one of the three performance 
measures mostly used in the paper (Excess Return, CAPM alpha or Carhart’s alpha) of 
mutual fund p in a particular month t. RSp,t-1 is the risk shifting measure as defined in 
equation 4 for mutual fund p in the prior month t-1. The additional control variables are 
the prior-year excess market return (Excess Returnp,t-1), the age of the fund defined as 
logarithm (LogAgep,t-1), the total net assets defined as logarithm (LogTNAp,t-1), the 
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management funds charged (Feesp,t-1), the turnover ratio (Turnoverp,t-1) as defined by 
Elton et al. (2010) and the percentage money flow over the prior year (Flowp,t-12). 
The regression has been estimated by using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
methodology. This method firstly run cross-sectional regressions each month and then, 
in a second step, the means of the cross-sectional coefficients over the whole time period 
are calculated.
Table 6 reports the multivariate regression estimates. The table shows a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the level of risk shifting (RS measure) 
and the subsequent performance when CAPM and Carhart’s alphas are examined. This 
statistically significant relationship is observed in both specifications, when only the RS 
measure is examined and when the additional control variables are introduced. Therefore, 
once again, our finding points out that increasing risk leads to a subsequent better 
performance. In relation with the control variables, the only variable that seems to be 
relevant is the lagged excess return. Its positive coefficient indicates some performance 
persistence.
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Table 5. Performance Consequences by Fund Characteristics
This table reports the future performance of the portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to their level of risk-shifting and fund characteristics that are related to risk shifting 
incentives (prior-year excess return, fund size, fund age, and fund management fees). Mutual funds are first sorted into two equal-sized groups according to whether the 
characteristic is above or below it median value. Then, funds are further divided into five groups according to their risk shifting level. Specifically, Panel A reports the CAPM 
alphas for the next month (period t+1), while Panel B reports the Carhart alphas. The table reports the performance of the ten portfolios formed for each fund characteristic and 
the differences in the future performance between the selected portfolios. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Prior Year Fund Performance  Fund Size  Fund Age  Fund Management Fees
RS Portfolio Low High L-H Small Large S-L Young Old Y-O Low High L-H
1 -0.26%*** -0.04% -0.21%** -0.12% -0.12%* 0.00% -0.20%* -0.10% -0.10% -0.19%* -0.14%* -0.05%
2 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 0.02% 0.10%* 0.01% 0.09%
3 -0.13%** 0.01% -0.14%** 0.01% -0.06% 0.06% 0.00% -0.05% 0.05% 0.01% -0.08% 0.09%
4 -0.09% 0.40%*** -0.50%*** 0.20%* 0.25%** -0.05% 0.13% 0.36%*** -0.23%** 0.30%*** 0.14% 0.17%
5 -0.19% 0.21%* -0.40%*** 0.04% 0.22%* -0.17% 0.07% 0.14% -0.07% 0.26%** -0.06% 0.32%***
# 5-1 0.07% 0.25%** -0.19%** 0.16% 0.34%*** -0.18% 0.27%*** 0.23%*** 0.04% 0.45%*** 0.08% 0.37%***
# 5-3 -0.06% 0.20%*** -0.26%*** 0.04% 0.28%*** -0.24%*** 0.07% 0.19%*** -0.12% 0.25%*** 0.02% 0.23%***
# 1-3 -0.12%* -0.05% -0.07% -0.13%* -0.06% -0.06% -0.20%*** -0.04% -0.16%** -0,20%*** -0.06% -0.14%***
             Panel B: Prior Year Fund Performance Fund Size Fund Age Fund Management Fees
RS Portfolio Low High L-H Small Large S-L Young Old Y-O Low High L-H
1 -0.32%*** -0.11% -0.21%** -0.16% -0.15%* -0.02% -0.30%*** -0.11% -0.19%* -0.27%*** -0.20%** -0.07%
2 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 0.05% 0.04% 0.02% 0.10%* 0.02% 0.09%
3 -0.15%** -0.06% -0.09% -0.03% -0.08% 0.05% -0.04% -0.07% 0.03% -0.02% -0.10%* 0.08%
4 -0.10% 0.24%** -0.35%*** 0.10% 0.13% -0.04% 0.02% 0.24%** -0.22%** 0.19%* 0.07% 0.13%
5 -0.14% 0.10% -0.23%* -0.02% 0.22%* -0.23%** 0.04% 0.11% -0.07% 0.25%*** -0.09% 0.33%***
# 5-1 0.18%* 0.21%* -0.03% 0.15% 0.37%*** -0.22%* 0.33%*** 0.21%*** 0.12% 0.52%*** 0.11% 0.41%***
# 5-3 0.01% 0.16%** -0.15%** 0.01% 0.30%*** -0.28%*** 0.08% 0.17%*** -0.09% 0.27%*** 0.01% 0.26%***
# 1-3 -0.17%*** -0.05% -0.12%* -0.14%** -0.07% -0.07% -0.26%*** -0.04% -0.22%*** -0,25%*** -0.10% -0.15%**
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
21
Table 6. Multivariate Performance Regression
This table reports the relationship between the performance of mutual fund portfolios and the risk shifting measure 
controlling for additional fund characteristics. The dependent variable in each cross-section is a performance measure. 
Specifically, in order to adjust for risk and style, we use three different performance measures: (1) Excess Market 
Return, (2) CAPM alpha and (3) Carharts’ alpha. The risk shifting measure used here is that defined in equation 4 
(measured as difference in risk). The additional control variables are the prior-year excess market return of a fund, the 
age of the fund defined as logarithm, the logarithm of the assets under management, the management fees, the turnover 
ratio, and the annual money flows over the prior year. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively using the Fama-MacBeth methodology.
Excess Return CAPM Carhart
RS 0.3411 0.0391 0.0270*** 0.0147*** 0.0206*** 0.0107***
Excess Market Return 0.0283*** 0.0028*** 0.0020***
Age 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
Size 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000*
Management Fees -0.0611 -0.0024** -0.0016
Turnover 0.0072* 0.0001 0.0001
Flow 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
Intercept 0.0010 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4.5 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting depending on Manager 
Characteristics.
Previous studies such as those by Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), Prather and Middleton 
(2002), and Bliss, Potter and Schwarz (2008) indicate that manager characteristics such 
as age, gender and tenure can affect the risk profiles of the portfolios managed. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) find that younger managers take on less unsystematic 
risk than older managers. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) also find that mutual fund 
managers who attended more selective undergraduate institutions have higher 
performance than mutual fund managers who attended less selective undergraduate 
institutions. Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynskia (2006) argue that experienced fund 
managers are less overconfident and take lower risks. 
As can be observed, there is a large variety of studies analyzing the impact of 
manager characteristics on performance and risk taking. We contribute to this literature 
by going a step forward through the analysis of the performance consequences of risk 
shifting depending on certain characteristics of fund managers.
To collect information on fund managers’ characteristics, we use the database, 
Morningstar Direct, which provides information on the managers’ name and the date on 
which the manager assumed responsibility for the fund. We match all funds from the 
CNMV database to the funds in the Morningstar database using the fund ISIN code. We 
focus on those fund-periods where mutual funds from our sample are single managed, 
since the objective is to analyze the performance consequences of risk shifting depending 
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on manager characteristics.15 Therefore, we exclude fund-month observations for which 
Morningstar reports a management team or provides multiple manager names for a given 
date.
For certain mutual funds, Morningstar does not report the manager name. Hence, 
in this section, we only consider those fund-observations where Morningstar reports the 
manager name. The Appendix shows the performance consequences of risk shifting for 
those funds where Morningstar provides manager information. Panel A of Table A1 in 
Appendix suggests the same conclusions as Tables 3 and 4. Those mutual funds that 
increase their risk level obtained significantly better performance than funds with stable 
or decreased risk. Hence, we can conclude that the existence of missing information on 
the variable manager name does not bias our findings.
Panels B and C disaggregate the results in Panel A splitting those fund-months with 
team managed funds and single managed funds, respectively. The findings once more 
confirm the outperformance of managers with an increase in the risk level. 
Similar conclusions are obtained in Table A2 in Appendix when the alternative RS 
measures are examined. Finally, it is important to highlight the increase experienced by 
the performance values for those funds for which Morningstar provides managers’ 
information (Panel A of Tables A1 and A2 in comparison with Panel A of Tables 3 and 
4); this appears to suggest that poor performing funds do not have incentives to report 
their managers’ names.
The manager characteristics that we consider include gender (female vs male 
managers), level of specialization (generalists versus specialists’ managers), tenure in the 
industry, age, and education (managers with a master degree or without). 
4.5.1 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting depending on Gender
Whether women behave differently from men has been extensively studied and reveals 
robust gender differences. The literature in economics and finance has concluded that 
women are more risk averse than men. Schmidt and Traub (2002) show women to be 
more loss averse than men. Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) show that women are 
significantly more risk averse, tend to be less overconfident and behave less competitively 
oriented. More recently, Welch and Wang (2013) also find evidence that female managers 
have a lower risk tolerance than males.
15 Baer, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) show that team managed funds and single managed funds behave 
differently, and it is not clear how the skills of single team members translate into the skills of a team.
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The financial literature has not only researched gender differences in manager 
decisions but also investor decisions. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that single 
women exhibit relatively more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men. 
Conversely, Dwyer, Gilkeson and List (2002) find that women exhibit less risk taking 
than men in their most recent and riskiest fund investment decisions.
Due to the abovementioned evidence, we analyze whether the performance 
consequences of risk shifting are different depending on manager gender. One could 
expect better performance results when women increase the risk of the portfolios due to 
their lower tolerance to risk. Women’s lower tolerance to risk will only lead them to 
increase their risk exposure when they have clearly detected an investment opportunity. 
Table 7 summarizes the performance consequences using the RS measure and the 
alternative metrics depending on the manager gender for the next month.16 
First, we observe that the performance consequences of increasing risk are positive 
regardless of manager gender and the risk shifting mechanism examined, although this 
figure only tends to be statistically significant for male managers. Second, Panel A 
(CAPM alpha) reveals that the consequences of increasing risk (RS measure) are stronger 
for male than for female managers, while it is the opposite in Panel B (Carhart alpha). 
This finding appears to suggest that male managers obtain superior levels of performance 
when increasing the risk level of their portfolios following investment strategies based on 
size, book to market or momentum. However, when these factors are considered, the male 
managers’ alphas suffer a relevant decrease. Therefore, as expected, women obtain better 
performance results than men when increasing the risk level of the overall portfolio, if 
the performance is calculated using the Carhart alpha; however, the difference between 
men and women in RS5 is not statistically significant.
Finally, Table 7 also highlights the timing ability of male managers (Equity-based 
RS measure); especially in bear markets since it can be observed a positive and 
statistically significant performance of male managers when reducing their exposure to 
the equity market.
16 Hereafter, tables only report the results obtained when analyzing the performance consequences for the 
next month (t+1). However, all the analyses have also been performed considering the consequences for 
the next quarter (t+3). The results are qualitative the same than for next month and therefore they are not 
reported here, although they are available upon request to the authors. Similarly, the tables hereafter do not 
report the results for the RS ratio due to their similarity to those obtained by using the RS measure. 
Nevertheless, those results are available upon request to the authors.
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Table 7. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting by Gender.
This table reports the future performance of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to their level of risk shifting and the manager gender. Specifically, Panel A reports the 
CAPM alphas for the next month (period t+1), while Panel B reports the Carhart alphas. Mutual funds are first sorted into male and female groups; then, they are further divided 
into five groups according to their risk shifting level. The table reports the performance of the ten portfolios formed for each RS measure and the differences in the future 
performance between the selected portfolios. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS Portfolio Man Woman M - W Man Woman M - W Man Woman M - W Man Woman M - W
1 0.01% -0.08% 0.09% 0.04% 0.08% -0.04% 0.32%* -0.02% 0.35%*** 0.46%*** -0.27% 0.73%
2 -0.05% 0.11%* -0.16%*** -0.05% 0.03% -0.08% 0.18% 0.10% 0.08% 0.29%** 0.06% 0.23%
3 0.29%** -0.12% 0.41%*** 0.28%** -0.02% 0.30%** 0.46%*** -0.01% 0.46%*** 0.32%** 0.10% 0.22%**
4 0.65%*** 0.00% 0.65%** 0.76%*** 0.00% 0.76%** 0.26%** 0.55%** -0.29% 0.20%* -0.01% 0.21%
5 0.51%*** 0.21% 0.31% 0.41%*** 0.07% 0.34% 0.18% -0.43% 0.61% 0.31%** 0.06% 0.25%
# 5-1 0.50%*** 0.28%*** 0.22%*** 0.37%*** -0.01% 0.38%*** -0.14% -0.40%*** 0.27% -0.15% 0.33%** -0.48%***
# 5-3 0.22%* 0.33%*** -0.10% 0.13% 0.09% 0.04% -0.27%** -0.42%*** 0.15% -0.01% -0.04% 0.03%
# 1-3 -0.28%** 0.04% -0.32%*** -0.23%** 0.10% -0.34%*** -0.13% -0.02% -0.12% 0.14% -0.37%*** 0.51%***
Panel B RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS Portfolio Man Woman M - W Man Woman M - W Man Woman M - W Man Woman M - W
1 0.02% -0.08% 0.10% 0.04% 0.11% -0.07% 0.23% -0.01% 0.25%*** 0.33%** -0.24% 0.56%***
2 -0.06% 0.14%** -0.2%*** -0.02% 0.04% -0.06% 0.17% 0.16% 0.01% 0.20% 0.16% 0.05%
3 0.13% -0.12% 0.26%** 0.11% -0.03% 0.14% 0.31%*** 0.03% 0.27%*** 0.10% 0.12% -0.02%
4 0.45%*** 0.29% 0.16% 0.59%*** 0.26% 0.33% 0.17% 0.89%*** -0.73%*** 0.10% -0.10% 0.20%
5 0.36%*** 0.48% -0.12% 0.27%** -0.07% 0.34% 0.00% -0.04% 0.03% 0.15% 0.17% -0.02%
# 5-1 0.35%*** 0.56%*** -0.21%*** 0.23%*** -0.18%* 0.41%*** -0.24% -0.03% -0.21% -0.17% 0.41%** -0.59%***
# 5-3 0.23%** 0.60%*** -0.38%*** 0.16% -0.05% 0.20%** -0.31%*** -0.07% -0.24%** 0.05% 0.05% -0.01%
# 1-3 -0.12% 0.04% -0.16% -0.07% 0.13% -0.20%** -0.07% -0.05% -0.03% 0.22%** -0.36%*** 0.58%***
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4.5.2 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting depending on Level of 
Specialization
Management companies can have incentives to assign portfolio managers depending on 
their abilities. Zambrana and Zapatero (2017) show that it is optimal to assign managers 
with market timing ability to generalist responsibilities (generalist managers are those 
who run funds comprising several investment objectives) and managers with stock-
picking ability to specialist responsibilities (they run portfolios on one investment 
objective).17 Consequently, we would expect that specialist managers are those with 
superior stock picking abilities and therefore, the managers who obtain better results 
when modifying the idiosyncratic risk of their portfolios. Similarly, we would expect that 
generalist managers exhibit more skills to time the market (i.e., to modify the portfolio 
asset allocation).
In accordance with Zambrana and Zapatero (2017), we measure the degree of 
specialization of the manager in each time period based on the difference between the 
overall number of funds managed by the manager and the number of funds managed in 
an investment vocation (in our case domestic equity mutual funds). When all mutual 
funds managed (or all expect one) belong to domestic equity funds, we classified this 
manager as a specialist; otherwise, the manager is classified as a generalist.
Table 8 summarizes the performance consequences of risk shifting depending on 
the level of the managers’ specialization. This table reinforces, once more, the main 
finding of this paper. That is, increasing the risk level of portfolios has positive 
performance consequences regardless of the level of specialization of the fund managers. 
Similar to Table 7, we also observe different behavior between specialist and generalist 
managers that increase risk (portfolio 5), whether we examine CAPM alpha (Panel A) or 
Carhart alpha (Panel B). When considering the CAPM alpha, we observe that generalist 
managers tend to outperform specialist managers although without statistical 
significance. This finding appears reasonable because generalist managers are expected 
to be more skilled when following size, book to market or momentum investment 
strategies. Hence, it is not surprising that the generalist managers’ performance decreases 
when Carhart alphas are examined. Concretely, specialist managers are those that 
outperform when increasing the overall and systematic risk level of the portfolios 
17 Fang, Kempf and Trapp (2014) also indicate that fund families allocate managers to market segments 
depending on their management skills. Specifically, fund families allocate their most skilled managers to 
inefficient markets to exploit the inefficiencies and generate higher performance.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
26
considering the Carhart alpha. Hence, we can see that specialist managers are able to add 
value in their portfolios when they increase the risk level even when controlling for the 
4-factors.
However, Table 8 does not exhibit a superiority of specialist managers’ vs 
generalists in increasing the idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, Table 8 does not exhibit 
outperformance of generalist managers compared with specialists in terms of their 
abilities to time the market (increase or decrease the percentage invested in equity 
holdings).
4.5.3 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting depending on Manager Tenure
Several empirical studies have analyzed whether risk taking changes with manager 
experience. Graham (1999), Li (2002) and Boyson (2003) find that risk aversion increases 
with manager experience. Similarly, Clement and Tse (2005) and Menkhoff, Schmidt and 
Brozynski (2006) also highlight that experienced managers are less overconfident and 
take fewer risks. However, other studies observe a positive relation between risk taking 
and experience (see, Chevalier and Ellison, 1999b; Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000 and 
Lamont, 2002). 
Conversely, prior literature also indicates that managers with more industry tenure 
are more aware of the true volatility of asset prices which might lead to better investment 
decisions. Hence, despite the contradictory evidence about the relationship between risk 
taking and manager tenure, we hypothesize that we should observe superior performance 
consequences when more experienced managers increase the risk level of their portfolios 
because they have “more to lose” in personal wealth and reputation than less experienced 
managers if they fail. 
Tenure in the industry is calculated from the first year that Morningstar reports for 
a manager in the database. Then, we divide mutual funds in each period into two groups 
depending on whether the manager tenure is above or below the median value. In a second 
step, we further divide the two groups of funds into five portfolios according to their most 
recent RS measure and estimate the CAPM and Carhart alphas of the portfolios formed. 
Table 9 summarizes the performance consequences of risk shifting depending on 
manager tenure. The table first shows that there are few statistically significant 
differences between more and less experienced managers.18
18 Note that the differences increase their significance when examining the consequences in the next quarter.
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Table 8. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting by Level of Specialization.
This table reports the future performance of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to their level of risk shifting and the type of responsibilities of fund managers. Managers 
are classified as generalist whether they run funds belonging to several investment objectives while they are classified as specialists whether they run funds on just one investment 
objective. Specifically, Panel A reports the CAPM alphas for the next month (period t+1) while Panel B reports the Carhart alphas. Mutual funds are first sorted into specialist 
and generalist groups and then they are further divided into five groups according to their risk shifting level. The table reports the performance of the ten portfolios formed for 
each RS measure and the differences in the future performance between the selected portfolios. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS 
Portfolio Specialist Generalist S - G Specialist Generalist S - G Specialist Generalist S - G Specialist Generalist S - G
1 -0.02% 0.13% -0.15% 0.06% -0.04% 0.11%* -0.02% 0.09% -0.11% 0.33%** -0.04% 0.37%***
2 0.06% 0.00% 0.06% 0.10% -0.06% 0.16%** 0.19% 0.20% -0.01% 0.27%* 0.15% 0.12%
3 0.12% 0.25%*** -0.13% 0.17% 0.21%** -0.04% 0.26%** 0.34%*** -0.08% 0.21%* 0.25%* -0.04%
4 0.45%*** 0.47%*** -0.02% 0.53%*** 0.71%*** -0.17% 0.47%*** 0.14% 0.33%*** 0.00% 0.25%* -0.25%*
5 0.39%** 0.46%*** -0.07% 0.38%** 0.35%** 0.03% -0.02% 0.16% -0.18% 0.32%* 0.02% 0.30%
# 5-1 0.41%*** 0.33%* 0.08% 0.32%*** 0.39%*** -0.07% 0.00% 0.07% -0.07% -0.01% 0.05% -0.07%
# 5-3 0.27%** 0.21%** 0.06% 0.21% 0.14% 0.07% -0.28%** -0.18% -0.10% 0.10% -0.23%* 0.33%***
# 1-3 -0.14% -0.12% -0.02% -0.11% -0.25%*** 0.14% -0.28%** -0.25%** -0.03% 0.12% -0.29%** 0.40%***
Panel B: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS 
Portfolio Specialist Generalist S - G Specialist Generalist S - G Specialist Generalist S - G Specialist Generalist S - G
1 -0.01% 0.16% -0.17% 0.07% -0.05% 0.12%* -0.09% 0.08% -0.16% 0.34%** -0.08% 0.42%***
2 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 0.12% -0.07% 0.18%*** 0.19% 0.15% 0.04% 0.34%** -0.01% 0.34%***
3 0.02% 0.15% -0.13% 0.07% 0.07% 0.00% 0.26%** 0.17% 0.10% 0.10% 0.06% 0.05%
4 0.45%*** 0.36%** 0.09% 0.54%*** 0.56%*** -0.02% 0.41%*** 0.10% 0.31%*** -0.11% 0.20% -0.31%**
5 0.40%*** 0.22% 0.18% 0.34%** 0.20% 0.14% -0.22% 0.09% -0.31%** 0.15% -0.12% 0.27%
# 5-1 0.42%*** 0.07% 0.35%*** 0.27%*** 0.25%*** 0.02% -0.13% 0.02% -0.15% -0.19% -0.04% -0.15%
# 5-3 0.39%*** 0.07% 0.31%*** 0.27%* 0.13% 0.14% -0.48%*** -0.07% -0.40%*** 0.05% -0.18% 0.23%*
# 1-3 -0.03% 0.01% -0.04% 0.00% -0.12% 0.12% -0.35%*** -0.09% -0.26%** 0.23%* -0.14% 0.37%***
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Table 9. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting by Tenure.
This table reports the future performance of the portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to their level of risk shifting and the level of tenure of fund managers. Managers are 
classified by high and low tenure to form two equal-sized groups according to whether the characteristic is above or below its median value. Specifically, Panel A reports the 
CAPM alphas for the next month (period t+1), while Panel B reports the Carhart alphas. Mutual funds are first sorted into high and low tenure groups and then they are further 
divided into five groups according to their risk shifting level. The table reports the performance of the ten portfolios formed for each RS measure and the differences in the 
future performance between the selected portfolios. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS Portfolio High Low H - L High Low H - L High Low H - L High Low H - L
1 0.09% -0.09% 0.18% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.12% -0.10% 0.18% 0.04% 0.14%
2 -0.02% 0.13%* -0.16%** 0.02% -0.04% 0.07% 0.09% 0.25% -0.16% 0.29%** 0.10% 0.19%
3 0.30%*** 0.06% 0.24%* 0.25%** 0.13% 0.12% 0.43%*** 0.19% 0.25%** 0.27%** 0.17% 0.11%
4 0.32%* 0.64%*** -0.32% 0.53%*** 0.57%*** -0.04% 0.18% 0.41%*** -0.23% 0.19% -0.03% 0.23%
5 0.46%*** 0.43%*** 0.03% 0.33%** 0.42%** -0.10% -0.06% 0.01% -0.07% 0.11% 0.30% -0.19%
# 5-1 0.37%*** 0.52%*** -0.15%*** 0.29%*** 0.41%*** -0.12%** -0.08% -0.11% 0.03% -0.07% 0.26% -0.33%**
# 5-3 0.16%* 0.37%*** -0.21%*** 0.08% 0.30%** -0.22%** -0.49%*** -0.17% -0.32%*** -0.17% 0.13% -0.30%**
# 1-3 -0.21%*** -0.15% -0.06% -0.21%** -0.11% -0.10% -0.41%*** -0.07% -0.35%*** -0.10% -0.13% 0.03%
Panel B: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS Portfolio High Low H - L High Low H - L High Low H - L High Low H - L
1 0.15%* -0.12% 0.27%* 0.07% 0.03% 0.04% 0.01% 0.13% -0.12% 0.12% 0.06% 0.07%
2 -0.02% 0.14%* -0.16%** 0.03% -0.05% 0.07% -0.01% 0.24% -0.25% 0.21% 0.15% 0.06%
3 0.20%*** -0.06% 0.26%** 0.12% 0.01% 0.10% 0.28%*** 0.14% 0.14% 0.05% 0.06% -0.01%
4 0.06% 0.53%*** -0.47%** 0.31%* 0.51%** -0.20% 0.14% 0.33%** -0.19% 0.10% -0.08% 0.18%
5 0.36%** 0.45%*** -0.09% 0.19% 0.32%** -0.13% -0.15% -0.14% -0.01% 0.02% 0.18% -0.16%
# 5-1 0.21%*** 0.57%*** -0.36%*** 0.12%** 0.29%*** -0.17%*** -0.16% -0.27%** 0.11% -0.10% 0.13% -0.23%*
# 5-3 0.17%** 0.51%*** -0.35%*** 0.07% 0.31%*** -0.24%** -0.43%*** -0.27%** -0.15% -0.03% 0.12% -0.15%
# 1-3 -0.04% -0.06% 0.01% -0.05% 0.02% -0.07% -0.27%*** 0.00% -0.27%*** 0.07% 0.00% 0.08%
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Second, we observe that experienced managers tend to obtain significantly better 
performance when they maintain stable risk levels in the overall portfolio and according 
to the idiosyncratic risk (see, e.g., Panels A and B). Third, Table 9 also confirms the main 
finding of this paper; increasing the overall level of risk and the systematic risk of fund 
portfolios leads to better performance than stable or decreasing risk levels, being this 
improvement in performance higher in less experienced managers.
4.5.4 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting depending on Manager Age
As with previous manager characteristics, the financial literature has also analyzed 
whether risk taking increases or decreases with manager age. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999b) find that younger managers take on less unsystematic risk than older managers. 
The researchers argue that younger managers have implicit labor market incentives, i.e., 
they are more likely to lose their jobs if their fund's beta or unsystematic risk level 
deviates from the mean of their objective group. Similarly, Avery and Chevalier (1999) 
also indicate that managers herd early in their careers and diverge in their actions later.
As the managers’ age is not explicitly provided in the Morningstar database, we 
compute the age by collecting the birth dates from specialized websites such as citywire 
or LinkedIn when available.19 Similar to industry tenure, we divide mutual funds in each 
period into two groups depending on whether manager age is above or below the median 
value. In a second step, we further divide the two groups of funds into five portfolios 
according to their most recent RS measure and estimate the CAPM and Carhart alphas of 
the portfolios formed. 
Table 10 summarizes the performance consequences of risk shifting depending on 
manager age. Similar to previous analyses, Table 10 also highlights the positive 
performance consequences of those portfolios increasing the total risk level. However, in 
contrast with previous manager characteristics, manager age is not revealed as an 
important variable to differentiate the performance consequences of risk shifting. There 
are few statistically significant differences in the future performance between young and 
old managers, a finding similar to the result obtained in the analysis of manager tenure. 
The only remarkable finding is that old managers outperform young managers when they 
maintain stable risk levels. This finding is very similar to that obtained with manager 
tenure.
19 Whether the birth date was not available and we have information about the year in which a manager got 
their university degree we follow Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) and assume that a manager was 21 upon 
university graduation.
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Table 10. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting by Manager Age.
This table reports the future performance of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to their level of risk shifting and the age of fund managers. Managers are classified as 
young and old to form two equal-sized groups according to whether the characteristic is above or below its median value. Specifically, Panel A reports the CAPM alphas for 
the next month (period t+1), while Panel B reports the Carhart alphas. Mutual funds are first sorted into young and old manager groups; then, they are further divided into five 
groups according to their risk shifting level. The table reports the performance of the ten portfolios formed for each RS measure and the differences in the future performance 
between the selected portfolios. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS 
Portfolio Young Old Y - O Young Old Y - O Young Old Y - O Young Old Y - O
1 0.02% 0.04% -0.02% 0.01% 0.15% -0.14% 0.08% 0.75% -0.67% 0.21% 0.13% 0.09%
2 0.00% -0.06% 0.07% -0.01% -0.02% 0.01% 0.43% 0.38% 0.04% 0.10% 0.26% -0.16%
3 0.11% 0.60%***  -0.49%*** 0.17%* 0.54%***  -0.38%** 0.41% 0.76%* -0.34% 0.09% 0.69%***  -0.60%***
4 0.41%*** 0.74%*** -0.33% 0.47%** 0.81%*** -0.34% 0.67% 0.23% 0.44% -0.04% 0.34%*  -0.38%**
5 0.57% 0.55% 0.02% 0.58% 0.41% 0.17% 0.47% 0.20% 0.28% 0.64% 0.26% 0.38%
# 5-1 0.55%*** 0.52%*** 0.03% 0.57% 0.26%* 0.30%*** 0.39% -0.56% 0.95% 0.42%*** 0.13% 0.29%**
# 5-3 0.46%*** -0.04% 0.50%*** 0.41%*** -0.13% 0.54%*** 0.06% -0.56% 0.62% 0.54%***  -0.44%** 0.98%***
# 1-3 -0.09%  -0.56%*** 0.47%*** -0.15%  -0.39%** 0.24%** -0.33% 0.00% -0.33% 0.12%  -0.57%*** 0.69%***
Panel B: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS 
Portfolio Young Old Y - O Young Old Y - O Young Old Y - O Young Old Y - O
1 0.03% 0.08% -0.05% 0.03% 0.13% -0.10% 0.06% 1.25% -1.19% 0.12% 0.08% 0.03%
2 -0.01% -0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.24% 0.39% -0.15% 0.20% 0.03% 0.17%
3 0.01% 0.35%*  -0.34%* 0.02% 0.28% -0.27% 0.42% 0.66% -0.25% -0.02% 0.32%*  -0.34%*
4 0.28%** 0.42%* -0.14% 0.43%** 0.48%** -0.05% 0.63% 0.30% 0.33% -0.09% 0.19% -0.28%
5 0.45% 0.40% 0.04% 0.37% 0.31% 0.06% 0.38% -0.19% 0.57% 0.45% 0.16% 0.30%
# 5-1 0.42%*** 0.32%** 0.10% 0.34%*** 0.18% 0.16%*** 0.32% -1.44% 1.76%*** 0.33%** 0.07% 0.26%*
# 5-3 0.43%*** 0.05% 0.38%*** 0.36%*** 0.03% 0.32%*** -0.03%  -0.85%* 0.82%* 0.47%*** -0.17% 0.63%***
# 1-3 0.02% -0.27% 0.28%***  0.01% -0.15% 0.16%*  -0.35% 0.59%  -0.94%**  0.13% -0.24% 0.37%***
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4.5.5 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting depending on Manager Education
Prior studies have also investigated the importance of manager education and how it 
affects portfolio performance and risk. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) find that mutual 
fund managers who attended more selective undergraduate institutions have higher 
performance than mutual fund managers who attended less selective undergraduate 
institutions. These authors argue that this difference is due to educational training, 
reinforcing that systematic risk is the sole type of risk that is compensated (not 
unsystematic risk). 
Gottesman and Morey (2006) find that managers who held MBAs from the highest 
ranked schools outperformed those with MBAs from unranked schools and those without 
MBAs entirely. Switzer and Huang (2007) show that managers with an MBA degree are 
more likely to take on extra risk by investing in high beta funds because they know that 
only systematic risk pays as a compensation for the risk assumed. Dincer, Gregory-Allen, 
and Shawky (2010) examine portfolio managers based on three educational factors (CFA, 
MBA, and experience) and determine their performance while controlling for risk and 
style methods. The researchers conclude that those managers with CFAs reduced 
portfolio risk while those with MBAs increased it.
As occurred with industry tenure, we should expect that the level of education 
impacts the risk shifting strategies of fund managers; consequently, more educated 
managers (managers with a master degree) should be more aware of the true volatility of 
asset prices; this may lead to superior investment decisions and therefore, superior 
performance consequences (see, e.g., Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynskia, 2006).
Table 11 summarizes the performance consequences of risk shifting depending on 
manager education (managers with a master degree versus managers without a master 
degree). Manager education appears to be an important variable to discriminate the 
performance consequences of risk shifting. First, if we explain the difference between 
increasing risk and maintaining stable risk levels or reducing them, we can observe that 
both managers holding a master’s degree and those without significantly outperform 
when increasing the overall risk level and systematic risk (see, e.g., the comparison of 
portfolio 5 vs 1 and portfolio 5 vs 3). Second, the use of the RS measure or the Systematic 
RS provides evidence in favor of managers with a master degree, because these managers 
significantly outperform the remaining managers both when they increase their risk level 
and particularly when they maintain stable risk levels. However, this performance 
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improvement disappears when the 4-factor alphas are considered. Conversely, the 
findings also reveal that managers with a master’s significantly increase the value added 
to their portfolios when they decrease the idiosyncratic risk; that is, when they diversify 
their portfolios.
5 Conclusions
This article analyzes the performance consequences of risk shifting through the analysis 
of monthly portfolio holdings to detect whether this behavior is explained by unskilled or 
agency-prone fund managers who trade for personal motivations, such as promotion or 
compensation, or is the result of skilled managers who trade to take advantage of their 
investment skills.
Our paper documents that funds that increase risk obtain a positive and statistically 
significant outperformance compared to funds that maintain stable risk levels and funds 
that reduce their risk in subsequent periods. This finding, in contrast to previous evidence 
in the US mutual fund industry, provides evidence that risk shifting is not harmful to 
investors in less developed markets; instead, it is the opposite. We also find that this result 
is very robust regardless of the mechanism of risk shifting used by managers (mainly 
changes in asset allocation and changes in the systematic risk). The findings obtained 
when using the idiosyncratic risk are slightly different. We obtain that increasing the 
idiosyncratic risk, which occurs when funds increase their portfolio concentration, leads 
to underperformance. This finding suggests that the driver of poor performance for 
increasing idiosyncratic risk is poor stock-picking abilities.
Finally, we also document that the positive performance consequences of increasing 
risk are robust to manager socio-demographic variables, such as age, gender, tenure, level 
of specialization and education. However, there are statistically significant differences 
depending on manager characteristics. Specifically, the decision of increasing risk is 
superior when it is made by a female or a specialist manager.
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Table 11. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting by Manager Education.
This table reports the future performance of the portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to their level of risk-shifting and the education of the fund managers. Managers are 
classified based on their education into two groups: managers with a master degree and managers without master degree. Specifically, Panel A reports the CAPM alphas for the 
next month (period t+1), while Panel B reports the Carhart alphas. Mutual funds are first sorted into Master and No Master groups; then, they are further divided into five groups 
according to their risk shifting level. The table reports the performance of the ten portfolios formed for each RS measure and the differences in the future performance between 
the selected portfolios. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS 
Portfolio Master No Master M - NM Master No Master M - NM Master No Master M - NM Master
No 
Master M - NM
1 0.07% -0.10% 0.17% 0.10% -0.12% 0.21%** 0.29%* -0.08% 0.37%*** 0.12% 0.17% -0.04%
2 -0.02% 0.12%* -0.15%** 0.05% -0.02% 0.07% 0.20% 0.09% 0.11% 0.28%* 0.19% 0.09%
3 0.29%* -0.02% 0.31%*** 0.27%* 0.07% 0.20%** 0.43%*** 0.05% 0.38%*** 0.43%*** -0.09% 0.52%***
4 0.64%*** 0.15% 0.49%*** 0.69%*** 0.24%* 0.44%*** 0.43%*** 0.20% 0.22%* 0.24%* 0.03% 0.20%
5 0.78% 0.17% 0.62% 0.58% 0.13% 0.45% 0.01% 0.24% -0.23% 0.20% 0.08% 0.13%
# 5-1 0.72%*** 0.27% 0.45%*** 0.49%*** 0.25%** 0.24%*** -0.28%* 0.31%*** -0.60%*** 0.08% -0.09% 0.17%
# 5-3 0.50%*** 0.19%** 0.31%** 0.31%** 0.06% 0.25%* -0.42%*** 0.19% -0.61%*** -0.22% 0.17%* -0.39%***
# 1-3 -0.22% -0.08% -0.14% -0.17% -0.19%** 0.01% -0.13% -0.12% -0.01% -0.30%** 0.26%*** -0.56%***
Panel B: RS measure Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RS
RS 
Portfolio Master No Master M - NM Master No Master M - NM Master No Master M - NM Master
No 
Master M - NM
1 0.11%* -0.24% 0.35% 0.12%** -0.13% 0.24%** 0.27% -0.09% 0.36%*** 0.09% 0.17% -0.09%
2 -0.04% 0.12% -0.15%* 0.06% -0.02% 0.09% 0.14% 0.20%** -0.06% 0.19% 0.24%* -0.06%
3 0.10% -0.03% 0.13% 0.04% 0.05% -0.01% 0.27%*** 0.06% 0.21%* 0.20% -0.11% 0.31%***
4 0.40%*** 0.23%* 0.17% 0.48%** 0.26%** 0.22%* 0.28%* 0.20% 0.08% 0.14% -0.11% 0.24%
5 0.47% 0.17% 0.30% 0.35% 0.12% 0.23% -0.21% 0.14% -0.35% -0.01% -0.04% 0.03%
# 5-1 0.36%*** 0.41%* -0.05% 0.23%*** 0.24%** -0.01% -0.48%*** 0.23%*** -0.71%*** -0.09% -0.21% 0.12%
# 5-3 0.37%*** 0.20%** 0.17% 0.31%** 0.07% 0.24%* -0.48%*** 0.08% -0.56%*** -0.21% 0.07% -0.28%**
# 1-3 0.01% -0.21%** 0.22% 0.07% -0.17%** 0.25%* 0.00% -0.15% 0.15% -0.12% 0.28%*** -0.40%***
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Appendix: Analysis of Risk Shifting consequences in funds with manager 
information.
Table A1. Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting for those funds with manager 
information.
This table reports the performance of mutual fund portfolios with manager information sorted according to 
the most recent risk shifting measure (RS measure). Specifically, the table summarizes the performance 
consequences in the short-term (next month, t+1). The table is divided into three panels.  Panel A 
summarizes the performance consequences for those funds that report manager information in Morningstar 
regardless of the type of management structure. Then, the results of Panel A are split into Panel B whether 
the funds are team managed and into Panel C whether the funds are single managed. All measures are 
expressed in % terms. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Funds with manager information
RS Portfolio Gross Return Net Return Excess Market CAPM Fama-French Carhart
1 0.15% 0.00% -0.09% -0.10%* -0.12%** -0.11%*
2 0.31% 0.15% 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.08%*
3 0.26% 0.10% 0.02% 0.03% -0.01% -0.01%
4 0.67%* 0.51% 0.42%** 0.48%*** 0.35%*** 0.33%***
5 0.65% 0.49% 0.41%** 0.46%*** 0.37%*** 0.40%***
# 5-1 0.50% 0.49% 0.50% 0.56%*** 0.48%*** 0.51%***
# 5-3 0.39% 0.39% 0.39% 0.43%*** 0.38%*** 0.41%***
# 1-3 -0.11% -0.10% -0.11% -0.13%*** -0.11%*** -0.10%***
Panel B: Team Managed Funds 
RS Portfolio
1 0.00% -0.14%  -0.26%***  -0.26%***  -0.27%***  -0.28%***
2 0.26% 0.10% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.07%
3 0.24% 0.08% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.03%
4 0.35% 0.20% 0.11% 0.14% 0.08% 0.13%
5 0.51% 0.36% 0.22% 0.27%* 0.17% 0.23%*
# 5-1 0.50% 0.50% 0.48% 0.53%*** 0.44%*** 0.52%***
# 5-3 0.27% 0.28% 0.20% 0.24%*** 0.16%*** 0.20%***
# 1-3 -0.24% -0.22% -0.28%  -0.29%***  -0.28%***  -0.32%***
Panel C: Single Managed Funds
RS Portfolio
1 0.24% 0.09% 0.00% -0.01% -0.04% -0.01%
2 0.20% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04%
3 0.40% 0.25% 0.16% 0.19%** 0.11% 0.07%
4 0.66% 0.50% 0.50%*** 0.54%*** 0.41%*** 0.39%***
5 0.63% 0.46% 0.38%** 0.44%*** 0.34%*** 0.35%***
# 5-1 0.38% 0.37% 0.38% 0.45%*** 0.38%*** 0.36%***
# 5-3 0.22% 0.21% 0.22% 0.24%*** 0.24%*** 0.28%***
# 1-3 -0.16% -0.16% -0.16% -0.21%*** -0.15%*** -0.08%***
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Table A2. Performance Consequences using alternative Risk Shifting Measures for those funds with manager information.
This table reports the CAPM, Fama and French and Carhart alphas of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to the most recent risk shifting measure. We compute four 
different measures of risk shifting: the ratio between the current holdings volatility and the past realized volatility, the systematic risk shifting, the idiosyncratic risk shifting, 
and the equity-based risk shifting measures. Specifically, the table summarizes the performance consequences in the short-term (next month, t+1). The table is divided into 
three panels.  Panel A summarizes the performance consequences for those funds that report manager information in Morningstar regardless of the type of management structure. 
Then, the results of Panel A are split into Panel B whether the funds are team managed and into Panel C whether the funds are single managed. All measures are expressed in 
% terms. *; ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Funds with manager information
RS ratio Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RSRS 
Portfolio
CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1  -0.11%*  -0.11%**  -0.12%** 0.01% 0.00% 0.03% 0.11% 0.08% 0.07% -0.05% -0.09% -0.07%
2 0.07% 0.04% 0.08% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04% 0.16%** 0.12% 0.14%* 0.14%* 0.11% 0.12%*
3 0.05% 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.01% 0.02% 0.19%*** 0.14%** 0.13%** 0.16%** 0.09% 0.06%
4 0.42%*** 0.31%*** 0.28%** 0.59%*** 0.45%*** 0.41%*** 0.28%*** 0.21%** 0.22%** 0.12% 0.04% 0.04%
5 0.55%*** 0.42%*** 0.44%*** 0.33%*** 0.22%* 0.26%** 0.10% -0.03% 0.00% 0.15% 0.09% 0.08%
# 5-1 0.65%*** 0.53%*** 0.56%*** 0.31%*** 0.22%*** 0.22%*** -0.01% -0.11% -0.07% 0.19%** 0.17%** 0.15%*
# 5-3 0.50%*** 0.41%*** 0.43%*** 0.28%*** 0.21%*** 0.24%*** -0.09%  -0.16%***  -0.13%** -0.01% 0.00% 0.02%
# 1-3  -0.15%**  -0.12%**  -0.13%** -0.03% -0.01% 0.01% -0.08% -0.06% -0.06%  -0.21%***  -0.17%***  -0.14%**
Panel B Team Managed Funds
RS ratio Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RSRS 
Portfolio
CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1  -0.27%***  -0.29%***  -0.31%*** -0.09% -0.10% -0.07% 0.04% 0.02% -0.01% -0.18%  -0.20%* -0.19%
2 0.17%* 0.14% 0.18%* 0.08% 0.06% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 0.08% 0.06% 0.08%
3 0.00% -0.02% 0.00% 0.08% 0.05% 0.10% -0.01% -0.04% -0.01% 0.05% 0.00% 0.04%
4 0.10% 0.05% 0.10% 0.17% 0.10% 0.12% 0.23%* 0.19% 0.27%** 0.02% -0.02% 0.00%
5 0.28%* 0.18% 0.24%* 0.19% 0.11% 0.16% 0.15% 0.06% 0.16% -0.05% -0.08% -0.05%
# 5-1 0.55%*** 0.47%*** 0.55%*** 0.29%*** 0.20%** 0.23%** 0.10% 0.04% 0.17%* 0.13% 0.12% 0.15%
# 5-3 0.27%*** 0.20%*** 0.24%*** 0.12% 0.06% 0.05% 0.16%** 0.10% 0.17%** -0.10% -0.08% -0.09%
# 1-3  -0.27%***  -0.27%***  -0.31%***  -0.17%**  -0.15%*  -0.18%** 0.05% 0.06% 0.00%  -0.23%***  -0.20%***  -0.23%***
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(continued)
Panel C: Single Managed Funds
RS ratio Systematic RS Idiosyncratic RS Equity-based RSRS 
Portfolio
CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart CAPM
Fama-
French Carhart
1 -0.06% -0.08% -0.08% 0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.11% 0.06% 0.08% 0.11% 0.05% 0.07%
2 0.08% 0.05% 0.09% 0.00% -0.04% -0.01% 0.20%* 0.15% 0.17% 0.23%** 0.19%* 0.20%*
3 0.16% 0.08% 0.05% 0.21%** 0.13% 0.09% 0.31%*** 0.23%*** 0.19%** 0.21%** 0.12% 0.06%
4 0.50%*** 0.37%*** 0.36%*** 0.62%*** 0.49%*** 0.48%*** 0.34%*** 0.26%*** 0.25%** 0.15% 0.06% 0.04%
5 0.52%*** 0.41%*** 0.40%*** 0.31%** 0.21%* 0.22%* 0.01% -0.12% -0.13% 0.13% 0.02% 0.02%
# 5-1 0.57%*** 0.48%*** 0.48%*** 0.27%*** 0.19%*** 0.16%*** -0.10%  -0.19%**  -0.22%** 0.02% -0.03% -0.05%
# 5-3 0.36%*** 0.33%*** 0.35%*** 0.10% 0.08% 0.13%  -0.30%***  -0.35%***  -0.32%*** -0.09% -0.09% -0.03%
# 1-3  -0.21%**  -0.16%* -0.13%  -0.17%* -0.10% -0.03%  -0.20%**  -0.16%* -0.11% -0.10% -0.06% 0.01%
